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THE PRESENT GENERATION of political scientists possesses a wealth
of knowledge about the logical structure of majority rule processes.  
Only thirty years ago Duncan Black began to publish a series of 
discoveries and rediscoveries about the properties of committee 
decisionmaking under majority rule.1 At almost the same time 
Kenneth Arrow proved a general result about the failings of col­
lective choice mechanisms which included majority rule as a special 
case.2 Anthony Downs insightfully applied these early findings to 
a political setting-that of free, two-party electoral competition3 
In the 1960s Plott identified a set of necessary and sufficient (and 
restrictive) conditions under which majority rule processes produce 
stable outcomes.4 Sloss generalized this work.5 Meanwhile, in a 
" An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Politi­
cal Science and the Study of Public Policy, sponsored by the Department of 
Political Science of Michigan State University, May 15-17, 1978, Hickory
Corners, Michigan. 
1 Duncan Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision Making," in Journal of 
Political Economy 56 ( 1948 ), 23-34.
2 Kenneth Arr ow, Social Choice and Individual Values 2d ed. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963) . 
3 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper,
1957). 
4 Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under
Majority Rule," American Economic Review ( 1967), 788-806.
5 Judith Sloss, "Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games," Public 
Choice (1973), 19-48. 
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series of articles Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook elaborated the 
Downsian model of electoral competition.6 Hoyer and Mayer,7 and 
McKelvey8 summarized and synthesized much of this scattered liter­
ature. 
The 1970s have seen developments on two fronts. On the sub­
stantive front majority rule models have been applied to legislative 
settings.9 More recently a succession of abstract analyses has ex­
plored the nature of the indeterminacy characteristic of majority 
rule processes.1° For two reasons, however, this latest line of re­
search brings us to an impasse. First, it dashes earlier hopes of 
finding reasonably broad contexts in which majority rule equilibria 
exist. · We now know that majority rule is generically unstable: 
the set of preference configurations which would support equilibria 
is vanishingly small. Second, earlier conjectures that the area of · 
majority rule disequilibrium would be small and centrally located 
also prove unfounded. The area of indeterminacy usually turns out 
to be the entire policy space: majority rule can result in literally 
any outcome, depending on what proposals are matched and in 
what order. ( See Appendix.) 
This onward march of knowledge has created an embarrassing 
situation for those who wish to apply abstract majority rule models 
to real political contexts. Take the study of electoral competition. 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists ( an exceedingly unlikely pos­
sibility, the theorists tell us), both candidates are expected to adopt 
6 For a review of thi s work see 0. Davis a nd P .  Ordesh ook, "A n Expository 
Development o f  a Mathmatical Model o f  the Electoral Proce ss," American 
Political Science Review, 64 ( 1970 ), 426-448. 
7 Robert Hoyer a nd Lawre nce S. Mayer, "Comparing Strateg ie s  in a Spat ial 
Model of Electoral Com pet it ion," American Journal of Political Science, (August 
1974), 501-523. 
8 Richard D. M cKelvey, "Poli cy Related Vot ing a nd Electoral Eq uil ibri um," 
Econometrica 43 ( 1975), 815-843. 
9 For a review of developme nt s  up t o  1975 see Joh n Ferejoh n a nd Morr is
Fior ina, "P urposive Models of Leg islat ive Behav ior," Amer ica n Eco nom ic A sso­
c iat io n  Papers a nd Proceedings, 65 (May 1975 ), 407-414. 
10 Ri chard M cKelvey, "Intra nsit ivit ie s  i n  M ult id ime nsio nal Vot ing Model s 
and S ome Implicat io ns for Age nda Control," Journal of Economic Theory 12 
( 1976); N. Schofield, "Instab ility o f  Simple Dynam ic Game s," Review of 
Economic Studies, 45 ( 1978), 575-594; Linda Cohe n, "Cycl ic Sets in Mult i­
d ime nsional Vot ing Models," So cial S cie nce Wo rki ng Paper No. 172, Cal ifornia 
I nst it ute o f  Te ch nology, August 1977; Linda Cohen a nd Steve n Matthews, 
"Constrai ned Plott Equ ilibr ia, D ire ct ional Eq uil ibr ia, a nd Global Cycl ing Sets," 
Social Science Working Paper No. 178, California Inst it ute of Te chnology, 
September 1977. 
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it and the election is expected to end in a tie. In the general case 
of no equilibrium, the candidate who moves last can always win. 
Several authors have suggested that incumbents, by virtue of their 
past records, are fixed points in the policy space.11 If so, the chal­
lenger can always defeat the incumbent. Thus, the application of 
abstract majority rule models to the study of electoral competition 
generates the conclusion that incumbents always lose, except for an 
occasional tie. This certainly qualifies as a nonobvious conclusion. 
Rather than abandon the model at this point, some scholars have 
tried to make the best of the nonobvious conclusion. Downs, for 
example, developed his classic concept of "the coalition of minori­
ties" after considering the hapless position of the incumbent party.12 
Kramer embraces the nonobvious conclusion by constructing a 
dynamic model in which the stationary incumbent loses every elec­
tion to the mobile challenger.13 The ensuing perpetual alternation 
of the two parties produces probabilistic convergence to a "cen­
trally located" portion of the policy space. 
Other researchers are less comfortable with the notion that in­
cumbents always lose. To be sure, of the last three American 
presidents, one lost, one withdrew, and one evidently feared defeat 
sufficiently to engage in some extraordinary campaign practices. 
American state governors, moreover, have long been known to ex­
perience rough electoral sledding.14 But when we turn to American 
congressmen, British MPs, legislators of all stripes-the abstract 
theoretical prediction fails. Indeed, a major current area of inquiry 
in the legislative subfield is to explain the apparently overwhelming 
advantage of incumbency. Obviously, a variety of ad hoc explana­
tions is available. Most of these focus on the invisibility of the 
challenger and the massive advertising campaigns of incumbents. 
But such explanations seem to conflict with the basic spirit of 
rational choice majority rule models, in that citizens are implicitly 
assumed to respond to advertising regardless of content. Granted, 
citizens may form their preferences on any basis they choose, but 
11 Kenneth Shep sle, "The Strategy of Am biguity: Un certainty and Ele ct oral
C om p etiti on," American Political Science Review 66 (1972), 555-568; Gerald 
H. Kramer, "A Dynami cal M odel of P olit ic<fl Eq uilibr ium," Journal of Economic 
Theory, in press. 
12 D owns, "An Economic Theory," Ch. 4.
13 Kramer, "A Dynamical M odel."
14 J . S. Turett, "The Vulnerab ility of Amer ican Govern ors, 1900-1969,"
The American Governor, ed. T. Beyle and 0. Will iam s, (New York: Harper
and R ow, 1971 ). 
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from an epistemological standpoint, to allow any and all preferences 
no matter how frivolous , is to trivialize the majority rule model. We 
doubt that many of its adherents would accept this way out. 
Our contention in this paper is that existing majority rule models 
are not empirically wrong, just incomplete, and not incomplete be­
cause they ignore personal psychology, but incomplete because 
they ignore certain obvious and easily representable asymmetries 
between the candidates. Existing models presume that candidates 
compete for executive office. The citizen assumes that if one can­
didate (or Downsian "team") wins, one platform is implemented, 
whereas if the opponent wins, another platform becomes public 
policy. But the situation is different when the citizen chooses be­
tween candidates for legislative office. Public policy is determined 
by the winning candidate from one district acting in concert with 
the winning candidates from all other districts. Other things equal, 
this fact diminishes the incentive for a citizen to vote on the basis 
of the candidates' policy platforms and increases uncertainty about 
the policy consequences of the election. At the least, the citizen 
must decide how to deal with that uncertainty, and some ways of 
dealing with it may involve increased attention to other factors, 
factors not limited to mere name recognition or a pretty face. 
This paper outlines an abstract model of voting in legislative 
elections. The model presumes that such elections take place in 
sirtgle member districts. Thus, it is principally applicable to the 
anglo-American democracies. Like the traditional models, this one
too presumes a fully informed citizen, but information is assumed 
to extend beyond knowledge of a policy space and the candidates' 
positions within it. By "fully informed" we mean a citizen who 
understands the various ways in which legislative activities affect 
bim, the essentials of legislative procedures and processes, and in 
particular the sources of influence within those processes.15 
Our contention is that modern legislators do more than participate 
in the formulation of major national policies. Too often it is as-
15 We are aware that survey d ata on c ongressional elect orate s pr ovide little
support for su ch a n  assumption. For reasons n ot e laborated here we think 
such dat a u ndere stimate the "true" st ate of awareness of the congressiona l 
e lect orate. But no matter, the ories like th at which foll ows do not ha ve value 
only if they descr ibe all citizens. If o ne is intere sted in examin ing marginal
changes (of which a shift of 5 per cent in the va lue of incumbency is a n  ex­
amp le), a the ory which accurate ly des cribes only a marginal number of citizens 
m ay be suffic ient to explain important ch anges in political proces ses and publi c 
policy. 
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sumed that electoral competition is limited to public goods space; 
this is an assumption which represents the most naive variant of 
classical democratic theory. Legislators from single-member dis­
tricts always have indulged and continue to indulge in a second 
activity: they provide quasi-private goods to their districts. The 
term "pork barrel" conjures up visions of legislators scrambling to 
procure dams, locks, irrigation projects, and public buildings and 
facilities of all kinds. Moreover, the concept now extends to de­
fense contracts, urban renewal and mass transit grants, neighbor­
hood health centers, worker tr�ining and retraining centers-the list 
is lengthy. 
In recent years yet a third activity has come to absorb an increas­
ing amount of legislators' time and resources: casework. The 
large, complex bureaucracies of modem postindustrial societies in­
creasingly impinge on the daily lives of their citizens. Regulations 
constrain what one can or can not do, and opportunities to profit 
from government programs are available to an ever larger portion 
of the citizenry. Although it is casually remarked that bureaucracies 
have a momentum of their own, it is true that legislators can have 
an impact on bureaucratic decisions, the more so the more discre­
tionary those decisions. This is particularly true in the United 
States where legislatures play an important role in the budgetary 
process and show considerable independence in the authorization 
process as well. But legislative concern with bureaucratic decision 
making is evident even in such purportedly "rubber stamp" legisla­
tures as the British Parliament.16 
The model we propose simply acknowledges that legislators en­
gage in each of the preceding three activities and that their con­
stituents recognize that they do so. Furthermore, the model in­
corporates an asymmetry between incumbents and their challengers, 
an asymmetry which we regard as empirically true and deserving of 
explicit theoretical recognition. 
THE ANALYSIS: THREE CONCERNS OF THE 
lNFOR.i.'1ED LEGISLATIVE ELECTORATE 
We assume that citizens' evaluations of the three varieties of 
legislative activity are analytically separable, i.e., that we can 
16 Bruce Ca in, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, "The House is not a Home:
MPs and their Constituencies," forthcoming, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
No vember, 1979. 
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examine each in isolation, then combine them under the assumption 
that no interactions override the separate analyses. 
The Policy Component of Congressional Voting 
In this section we denote the incumbent's platform by I, and the 
challenger's platform by C. The standard electoral competition 
model presumes that the citizen's preferences for candidates can be 
represented by a utility function whose arguments are the policies 
advocated by the candidates and those preferred by the citizen, i.e., 
candidate I is preferred to candidate C only if U (I) > U ( C).
Perhaps the preceding formulation is a useful approximation of 
a citizen's evaluation of candidates for executive office. In that case 
the citizen presumably gets one platform or the other, although real 
governors, premiers and presidents £nd themselves stymied to some 
extent by legislatures, bureaucracies and courts. But what about 
the evaluation of candidates for legislative offices? The winning 
candidate joins other winning candidates ( 434 other winning candi­
dates in the case of the U.S. House of Representatives) who col­
lectively determine an outcome. 
In a legislative election it seems more accurate to model the citi­
zen as choosing between lotteries. With some probability, p(I), 
the incumbent will successfully implement his platform, and with 
complementary probability will not, and similarly for the chal­
lenger. The expected utilities of the legislative candidates based on 
policy stands are given by the following equations: 
EU(Ip ) p (Ip )U(Ip ) 
p(  Cp) U(Cp) 
+ (1-p ( Ip )  ) U (L"'-lp ) } (l)
+ ( 1-p ( Cp) ) U ( L ""-Cp) 
Just what are the outcomes when the candidates fail to implement 
their platforms? Letting script L signify "Legislature," the preced­
ing equations posit that the citizen forms estimates of the outcomes 
the legislature produces (would produce) if the incumbent and 
challenger respectively were unsuccessful in implementing their 
platform.17 These ( L "'-I) and ( L ""-C) outcomes are basically
those which obtain when the citizen's representative make no differ­
ence to the policy output of the legislature. In the remainder of 
17 In the real world success is seldom an all or nothing proposition as is 
assumed here. An alternate interpretation of ( 1 ) would be that the citizen
expects a weighted average of the positions of the incumbent (challenger) and 
the rest of the legislature.
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this analysis we will assume that the citizen estimates that ( L "'-I) = 
( L ""-C) =ND, the "no difference' outcome.18 
At this point we abandon the symmetry which characterizes 
existing models by making the following assumption of incumbent 
effectiveness: 
(2) 
There are numerous empirical grounds on which to motivate this 
asymmetric assumption. Most obviously, the incumbent has a store 
of experience-first hand knowledge of how legislative processes 
work. Second, incumbents may hold formal positions of authority. 
Currently in the U.S. House, for example, there are about 175 com­
mittee and subcommitee chairmanships as well as a variey of party 
posts. In any given election probably 40 percent or more of Ameri­
can voters are evaluating an incumbent who holds a leadership 
post. Third, the odds are that incumbents are members of the 
majority party (roughly 2:1 in the U.S. House at present), and thus 
more able to influence the committee and party leadership. Of 
course, the assumption of incumbent effectiveness can go awry in 
some cases-particularly for minority party members-but in gen­
eral we think it captures an important feature of legislative elections. 
In choosing between incumbent and challenger the citizen de­
termines whether EU (Ip) > EU ( CP) or vice-versa, making no 
choice if they are equal. Thus the incumbent is preferred on policy 
grounds if 
p (Ip ) U (Cp) U (ND) 
> (3a) 
p (Cp) U(Ip ) U(ND) 
when U (Ip) > U(ND) 
or if 
p (Ip ) U (Cp) U (ND) 
< (3b) 
p (Cp) U (Ip ) U(ND) 
when U(Ip) > U (ND) 
18 This appears to be a harmless assumption. The only time it might be
seriously in error would be if the legislature were divided evenly between the 
two parties. In this case which of the two candidates won in the district under 
consideration could determine the organization of the legislature, the identity 
of the prime minister, etc.
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TABLE l 
CANDIDATE PREFERENCES BASED ON POLICY COMPONENT 
OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING 
Incumbent Ranked First: 
U (I) > U (ND) > 
U (I) > U (ND)
U (I) > U (C) > 
U (I) > U (C)
Incumbent Ranked Last: 
U (C) > U (ND)
U (C) > U (ND)
U (ND) > U (C)
U (ND) > U (C)
Incumbent Middle Ranked: 
U (C) > U (I) > 
U (ND) > U(I) > 
Indifference: 
U (  I) U( C) 
U (C) 
U (C) 
U (ND) 
U (ND) 
> U (I)
U (I) 
> U (I)
U (  I) 
U (ND) 
U(C) 
U (ND) 
prefer I 
prefer C 
depends, IE favors I 
depends, IE favors C 
indifference between I and C 
From the incumbency effectiveness (IE) assumption we know that 
p (Iv) /p ( Cv) is greater than one. This fact permits a determination 
of the candidate preferences produced by all but two of the possible 
preference orderings over the alternatives { I,C,ND } . These impli­
cations are contained in Table l where notation is simpli£ed by 
suppressing the subscript, p. The striking thing about Table 1 is the 
perfect symmetry which exists even under the asymmetric assump­
tion of incumbent effectiveness. For every preference ordering 
which produces a preference for the incumbent, there is a "mirror 
image" which produces a preference for the challenger . Evert the
two indeterminate cases contain a curious symmetry: the compara­
tive statics are precisely opposite. That is, if U ( Cv) > U (Ip) > 
U (ND), increased incumbent effectiveness is more likely to produce 
an incumbent preference (the citizen may prefer a second choice 
who is more effective ) . But if U (ND) > U (I) > U ( C) , increased
incumbent effectiveness is less likely to produce an incumbent pref­
erence. 
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The underlying basis for all this symmetry is clear upon a mo­
ment's reflection. Incumbent effectiveness is a two-edged sword. 
Those who favor the incumbent's platform ( relative to the C and 
ND alternatives) naturally value incumbent effectiveness. But 
those who dislike the incumbent's position to the extent that they 
would prefer the position of the rest of the legislature do not attach 
positive value to incumbent effectiveness. Quite the contrary. 
They would sooner countenance an incompetent challenger than an 
effective incumbent whose policies they loathe. In short, incum­
bency effectiveness does not translate directly into incumbency ad­
vantage. 
There is a variety of perspectives from which to view Table 1. 
One of the most interesting is from the point of view of a world 
in which policy preferences are randomly distributed. If we were 
to take 100,000 citizens ( a  low estimate of average turnout in an 
off-year American election) and assign them values of U(Ip), 
U ( CP), and U (ND) on a random basis, then have them vote in 
accord \vith 3a and 3b, the expected outcome of the election would 
be a tie. Thus, the incumbency advantage is not the simple result 
of incumbent effectiveness.
Random worlds aside, a second possible perspective is that taken 
by existing models of electoral competition. What happens when 
a majority rule equilibrium exists? When one does not? To ad­
dress these questions it is necessary to make a rather strong assump­
tion: all citizens in a district form the same estimates of legislative 
output when their representative makes no difference, i.e., all citi­
zens agree upon the policies signified by ND ( they may of course 
differ about the desirability of ND). 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists, electorally rational candi­
dates choose it. Thus, assuming the equilibrium is distinct from 
ND, only three preference patterns are present in the electorate: 
U ( Iv U (  Cp ) 
U ( lp U (  Cv ) 
U ( ND) > U ( Ip ) 
> U(ND) 
U ( ND) 
U(Cv ) 
9 prefer I 
=> indifference 
9 prefer C 
From the definition of a majority rule equilibrium a minority of 
citizens has the third ordering.19 Moreover, assuming indifferents 
split their vote exactly 50-50, the definition precludes the third group 
19 If a majority had the thi rd ord ering, ND would be majority preferred to 
I and C, contrary to the definition of a majority rule equilibrium. 
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from being larger than the £rst. Thus incumbency effectiveness 
gives the incumbent an edge. 
In the much more likely case of no majority rule equilibrium, the 
incumbent, who moves first in the electoral game (by casting roll 
call votes, for example) , can be outmaneuvered by the electorally 
rational challenger. Thus, a majority of citizens has one of the 
following preference orderings: 
U (CP ) > U(ND) > 
. 
U(Ip ) 
} which produce
U (ND) > u ( CP ) > u (IP ) challenger preferences 
U ( CP ) > U (IP ) > U (ND) which is indeterminate
In this case the incumbent can win only if the third category 
is sufficiently numerous and sufficiently responsive to incumbent 
effectiveness to deny the challenger a majority. And what is the 
incumbent's strategy? Those in the third category are susceptible 
to arguments for incumbency effectiveness-campaigns based on 
experience, seniority and the like. But remember, there is a "mirror 
image" category ( U (ND) > U (I) > U ( C) ) , some of whom are 
already in the incumbent's camp, who will be repelled by that very 
strategy. In sum, given the likely nonexistence of a majority rule 
equilibrium, the electoral prospects of the incumbent are not gen­
erally predictable; they depend on the precise configuration of voter 
preferences. 
All of the foregoing can be summarized in a fairly simple state­
ment. In a full information model of competition for legislative 
office, where competition is restricted to the policy domain, and 
incumbents are more effective than challengers in influencing policy, 
incumbency carries no general electoral advantage. 
The Pork Barrel Component of Legislative Voting 
Once a program is in operation the concern of the legislator may 
change. The costs of national activities are spread across all dis­
tricts but the benefits typically can be and are appropriated by 
specific areas and/ or groups. \Vhether a particular legislator favors 
the virtually unlimited construction of water treatment plants, for 
example, once the legislature has made that decision a legislator 
should attempt to procure as many plants for his or her district as 
possible. After all, construction of the plants creates jobs and per­
haps cleaner water, most of which will be paid for by taxes raised 
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in other districts. In addition, the plants serve as visible reminders 
of the efforts of the legislator on behalf of the district. 
In the pork barrel sphere the informed voter has no difficulty in 
specifying the ND outcome: nothing. In the legislature it is every 
district for itself. If one's representative does not bring home the 
bacon, no one does. This fact severely restricts the domain of 
reasonable preferences for the informed voter: some is better than 
none. The incumbent and challenger may have a different emphasis 
(urban pork vs. rural pork, construction pork vs. services pork, etc.), 
but the pork package advocated by either should be preferred to 
the ND outcome which is simply no benefits with virtually the 
same taxes. 20 Thus, the citizenry will fall into the following two 
categories: 
U (h ) > U (Cb) > U (ND) 
U (Cb) > U(h) > U(ND) 
(4) 
If we let b(Ib) and b ( Cb) denote the incumbent's and challenger's 
respective probabilities of delivering the benefits they promise, the 
expected utility of the incumbent from pork barrel programs, 
EU(Ip) ,  exceeds that of the challenger, EU ( Cb) , if 
b (h) U (Cb) - U (ND) 
> 
b (Cb) U(h) - U (ND) 
Again we assume incumbent effectiveness: 
b (Ib )  > b (Cb) . 
(5) 
All citizens with the first preference ordering listed in ( 4) satisfy
( 5), i.e., prefer the incumbent. In addition some of those with the
second ordering also satisfy ( 5). Moverover, as the relntive effec­
tiveness of the incumbent increases, the proportion of voters with 
the second ordering who will vote for the incumbent will also in­
crease. 
20 The reader no doubt can recall some well publicized examples in which a
pork barrel project became a major issue. We concede that exceptions to the 
general argument exist. But legislators generally avoid pork barrel activities 
which will arouse opposition within their districts. This means that different 
legislators emphasize different aspects of the pork barrel, e.g., dams and other 
construction in one district, health centers in others, defense contracts in still 
others, etc. 
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ConsideriQ.g a random world again, the conclusion for the pork 
barrel component of an election is different from that suggested for 
the policy component. With randomly assigned preferences (sub­
ject to the restrictions embodied in ( 4), the incumbent would
expect a minimum of half the votes, expecting a vote proportion in 
the interval [.5, LO] rather than exactly at .5 as previously. This 
advantage results directly from the relatively greater homogeneity 
of preferences in the pork barrel sphere. All constituents would 
rather have something than nothing, so to speak 
If a majority rule equilibrium exists in the pork barrel arena, 
U (Cb) > U (ND) for all citizens, 
and the incumbent is unanimously preferred. If there is no ma­
jority rule equilibrium, the incumbent can be outmaneuvered so 
that for a majority, 
U (Cb) > U ( h) > U (ND) => indeterminate preference
while for the remainder, 
U(Ib) > U(Cb) > U(ND) => prefer I. 
The incumbent can win if enough of those in the first category 
prefer a more effective second choice to a less effective first choice. 
Ceteris paribus, the greater is the relative effectiveness of incum­
bents, the greater is the likelihood that "enough" of those in the 
first category will prefer the incumbent to the challenger. 
The upshot of all this is clear. If we were incumbents, we would 
rather campaign on pork than on policy, unless we had some prior 
assurance that policy preferences would be as homogeneous as pork 
preferences are expected to be. 
The Casework or Service Component of Legislative Voting 
The service component is essentially the same as the pork barrel 
component. The incumbent and challenger may differ in emphasis, 
but the package of ombudsman services offered by either is pre­
ferred to the ND outcome, which again is no services. In the 
U.S., for example, if your representative will not oblige you by 
tracking down a lost social security check or interceding with 
OSHA, no one else will. Thus, the informed citizen should have 
one of the following two preference orderings for packages of 
services: 
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U(Is ) > U(Cs) > U(ND) 
( 6) 
U(Cs) > U(Is ) > U(ND) 
If we let s (Is) and s (Cs) stand for the incumbent' s and chal­
lenger's respective probabilities of delivering their promised package 
of services, the expected utility of the incumbent from services, 
EU( Is) exceeds that of the challenger, EU( Cs) if 
s ( Is ) u ( Cs) - u ( ND)
> 
s ( Cs) U(Is) - U(ND) 
(7) 
As in the pork barrel case the incumbent would have an expecta­
tion in the interval [.5, 1.0] if the service component alone were 
operating in a random world. If a majority rule equilibrium exists, 
the incumbent would win a unanimous yictory. If no such position 
exists, the incumbent should stress effectiveness. Again, if we were 
incumbents who wished to stay incumbents, we would rather run 
as ombudsmen than as the architects of national policy. 
Summary of the Voting Model 
In the preceding pages we have tried to develop a model which 
would allow incumbents an edge in legislative elections rather than 
place them at a disadvantage as interpretations of existing models 
seem to do. Our model differs from its forerunners in two respects. 
First, it recognizes the varied nature of legislative activity. The 
formulation of national policy is not the only task engaged in by 
contemporary legislators. Constituents expect other things as well, 
and these other expectations are likely to be more homogeneous 
than those concerning policy formation. Second, our model recog­
nizes that election of a legislator is not equivalent to selection of a 
policy program; election only sends legislators into another game 
with other elected candidates. Thus, in legislative elections citizens 
are choosing between platforms which will be realized only proba­
bilistically. And in very large legislatures (especially in systems 
with independent executives) these probabilities will generally be 
very small. As a result, voters must consider what happens in the 
event that neither contending candidate is effective, a third prospect 
not apparent in models of two candidate competition for executive 
office. Moreover, in choosing between two legislator-lotteries citi-
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zens presumably are discerning enough to recognize that experience 
in holding office has certain consequences. Is it not reasonable to 
assume that a subcommittee chairman with six years experience 
will be more effective than a freshman Republican, for example? 
We have shown that the interaction between incumbent effective­
ness and preference homogeneity generates an incumbency ad­
vantage. Interestingly, however, where preferences are heterogene­
ous, as they may be in the policy realm, incumbency effectiveness 
cuts both ways. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
One mark of a useful theory is its ability to illuminate facts be­
yond those it was constructed to explain. In this section we discuss 
a variety of empirical hypotheses implied by our model of legislative 
voting. These hypotheses fall into two categories: process im­
plications and policy implications. 
Process Implications 
The model suggests that incumbents will place a heavy emphasis· 
on project, grant, and service activities in their electoral campaigns, 
because it is in these areas that incumbency generates an electoral 
advantage. Thus, we expect incumbent advertising to focus heavily 
on the aforementioned activities. It is no accident, for example, 
that even conservative U.S. Representatives herald their success in 
bringing federal monies to their districts.21 Moreover, we should 
observe incumbents attempting to project an image of concern 
with the personal problems of constituents, and of willingness to 
help with such problems. Fenno has noted congressional incum­
bents' efforts to build feelings of generalized trust and accessibility 
among constituents. 22 Our argument implies that incumbents are· 
not just playing on affective feelings on the part of their constitu­
ents. In addition, they may be rationally encouraging constituents 
21 When Representative Burt Talcott (Republican, California) found him­
self in a tough race in 1976 he pitched his campaign around the theme that his 
Monterey district ranked third among 435 congressional districts in receipt of 
federal money. Talcott's 1976 ADA score was ten. He lost the election but 
the strategy was clear. 
22 Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1978) 54-60, 131-135, and passim. 
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to form high estimates of incumbent effectiveness in an area (per­
sonal servicing) where high estimates lead to electoral successes. 
Only when issue positions enjoy overwhelming majority support 
among constituents should we observe incumbent emphasis on is­
sues. It is easy and safe to be policy oriented if one is on the 
right side of an 80:20 split. 
A second set of process implications concerns comparisons across 
legislatures. Although legislative incumbents in general are ex­
pected to shy away from an issue emphasis relative to a service and 
project emphasis, certain features of legislatures may reinforce that 
tendency. For example, in the U.S. House we find a strong com­
mittee system, the components of which are relatively autonomous 
when overseeing the bureaucracy, but much less so when drawing 
up national policy. Thus, for the typical U.S. representative, 
b(I) > p(I) , s(I) > p(I) , providing all the more reason for a 
project and service emphasis. In contrast, legislatures with a weak 
or nonexistent committee system (such as the British Parliament) 
provide a more balanced incentive system to their members and in 
tum to their electorates. In proportional representation ( PR) sys­
tems the model ceases to apply. In a PR system projects and serv­
ices may provide benefits to a party, but not directly to a particular 
legislator. As with public goods generally, individuals will tend to 
shirk the cost of providing the general (i.e. party) benefit. Thus, 
legislative systems probably can be arrayed along a rough con­
tinuum according to the incentives they provide their members and 
voters to emphasize distributive policies and individual services 
relative to policy formation. 
A third set of process implications follows from a consideration 
of estimates of incumbency effectiveness. Other things equal the 
size of the incumbency advantage should vary with certain ob­
jective characteristics of incumbents. Most obviously, members of 
an apparently permanent majority party should have an even 
greater advantage. Voters will realize that the minority party can­
didate has little chance to implement a policy proposal. And when 
voters tum to the project and service components, the majority 
party candidat�specially if incumbent-will typically have the 
advantage there because the majority controls the committee struc­
ture. Once the legislative party balance appears to depart perm­
anently from an even split, the incentives facing voters will lead to 
eventual eradication of the minority party unless some exogeneous 
shock to the system overrides the micro-motives we have identified. 
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Policy Implications 
If the theory developed in section II accurately describes certain 
aspects of electoral reality, three public policy tendencies should 
exist. For shorthand we refer to these as the bureaucratic tendency, 
the distributive tendency, and the growth tendency. We stress the 
use of the term "tendency." Public policy will be more bureaucrat­
ically organized, more distributive in nature, and more extensive in 
scope than it would be in the absence of a legislative incumbency 
advantage, but the theory does not enable us to say how much more 
-perhaps a little bit, perhaps a lot. Moreover, while these tend­
encies constitute inefficiencies or· costs associated with an incum­
bency advantage, any ultimate assessment of net impact should take 
account of positive aspects of service and project activities as well. 
The expertise and influence of a representative in speeding bureau­
cratic actions and lowering the cost of dealing with government 
have some value to society. Nevertheless, an incumbency advantage 
arising from service and project activities does change the nature of 
democratic government in potentially troubling respects. 
The Bureaucratic Tendency 
Because of the electoral advantage ansmg from influence over 
the bureaucracy incumbents should hestitate to create programs 
which are beyond discretionary control. In practice this means that 
programs will require more in the way of bureaucratic inputs than 
might be ideal. The point is best illustrated by American examples. 
There is something to be said for razing the present jerry-built struc­
ture of income security programs and replacing it with a guaranteed 
annual income implemented entirely through the tax laws. The 
marginal cost of expanding IRS would be less than the savings 
accomplished by closing down numerous existing transfer programs. 
Similarly, we might eliminate the congeries of federal grant-in-aid 
programs to states and localities and replace it with general revenue 
sharing. As before, the bureaucratic savings are manifest. In each 
of these cases there are arguments on both sides, of course, but one 
argument that is seldom recognized is the congressional stake in 
maintaining the more bureaucratic way of doing things. Naturally, 
legislators dislike the uncertainty attendant upon any major pro­
gram shift. But beyond that, if bene£ts are distributed automatically 
(through tax refunds, quarterly revenue-sharing checks, etc. ) consti­
tuents may come to expect them as their due and not regard them, 
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at least in part, as the gift of benevolent legislators. And if costs 
are imposed automatically (tax payments) , fewer citizens are likely 
to seek the aid of their representative in efforts to avoid those costs. 
The Distributive Tendency 
This second tendency is related to the first. Again, let us consider 
American examples. There is widespread agreement among profes­
sional economists that tax schemes are superior to subsidies and 
mandatory standards as means of attacking some important pollu­
tion problems. Yet one of the most popular congressional programs 
provides localities with grants to construct water treatment plants 
to conform to congressionally mandated standards. 23 The Model 
Cities program, originally conceived as a demonstration project in 
a handful of carefully selected locations, was quickly extended to 
a pork barrel program for hundreds of communities, many of which 
were not even cities.24 The common thread in such examples is the 
distributive tendency. 
Put most simply, representatives favor federal programs whose 
effects appear as federal (i.e. congressional) "gifts" to their districts. 
Building thousands of sewage treatment plants may be an uneco­
nomic way of cleaning up our nation's water, but the political bene­
fits are no doubt positive. while taxing those who spoil the water 
might entail a net political cost. Similarly, spreading Model Cities 
projects around the country was the cost of getting any program at 
all through Congress. These and other distributive policies may 
create the illusion that the district has gotten something that the 
rest of the country has paid for; universal taxes or benefits are less 
likely to create such illusions. 
Lowi argues that political science operates according to the 
axiom that "policy determines politics."25 His observation is in­
sightful but we should recognize too that politicians prefer some 
kinds of politics to others. In particular, passing out federal plums 
is more pleasant than reforming the nation's tax laws. Redistribu-
23 These are the water treatment plant construction grants now authorized 
by the C lean Water Act of 1972 and administered by the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency. 
24 For a discussion of the Model Cities Program, see Randall Ripley, The 
Politics of Economic and Human Resources Development (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Bobbs -Merri ll, 1972), Ch. 5. 
25 Theodore Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politic s and Choice," Public 
Administration Review, ( 1972 ) , 298-310.
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tive policy creates a kind of politics different from distributive 
policy, a more difficult and dangerous kind of politics, and for that 
reason politicians prefer the latter arena to the former. 
Recall the old concept of the "life cycle" of an issue. Issues arise 
from the agitation of intense minorities, some eventually become the 
subject of national debate, and some of these eventually become 
public policy after a difficult fight. But then the policy supposedly 
becomes widely accepted-"legitimated" is the term often applied 
-and controversy wanes. One explanation is that opponents of the 
policy see its worth after it is implemented. An alternate account 
is that great issues typically arise in the redistributive or regulatory 
arenas. By the time they become law, however, they are heavily 
infused with distributive elements in order to buy critical congres­
sional support. This transition from regulatory or redisributive 
policy to distributive then continues as the policy is administered. 
Controversy wanes precisely because the class of beneficiaries grows 
so large. Stockman describes just such a process in his discussion 
of the "social pork barrel."26 Republicans who originally went to 
the mat against various Great Society programs quietly voted for 
renewal when the programs came up for reauthorization. 
To return to the general point, the distributive tendency seems to 
be a natural concomitant of our theory. When the choice is avail­
able, legislatures should prefer to structure programs so that de­
cisions are project-by-project, or grant-by-grant. Automatic distri­
bution according to a fixed formula is not nearly so attractive poli­
tically. Perhaps an underemphasized reason for Lyndon Johnson's 
success in steering Great Society programs through Congress was 
his appreciation for and willingness to use distributive politics to 
purchase congressional support.27 Correspondingly, failure to ap­
preciate ( or unwillingness to deal with) distributive policymaking 
may be one of Carter's principal problems vis-a-vis his party in Con­
gress.28 
One final remark. The distributive tendency no doubt reinforces 
26 David Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," Public Interest ( 1975), 3-30. 
27 At the beginning of Johnson's administration exactly two-thirds of all 
federal grants were project grants (the remainder being formula grants ) . Dur­
ing the three-year period 1964-66 over 80 percent of new grant programs were 
of the project variety. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela­
tions, Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System 1 (October 1967), 151.
28 Eric Davis, "Legislative Liaison in the Carter Administration," Political 
Science Quarterly, 95 ( 1979 ), 287-301. 
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the bureaucratic tendency. Project-by-project decisions require 
more bureaucratic resources than automatic distribution programs. 
Additionally, once a program is enacted, the game changes. Con­
tinued opposition to a program would only succeed in penalizing 
one's district, not ' as a result of direct bureaucratic action, but by 
foregoing what �vould be one's due under the (increasingly distribu­
tive) program. In short, incentives change after a policy is im­
plemented. Given that a program will be enacted, a representative 
faces better reelection prospects if the program is designed to be 
distributive in nature and bureaucratic in administration. 
The Growth Tendency 
This third tendency is in part a consequence of the preceding 
two, and in part a consequence of factors not explicitly included in 
the theory. Stated simply, our model suggests that a legislative in­
cumbency advantage contributes to a larger public sector. In ex­
plaining why, it is useful to recognize at least three dimensions of 
government growth. 
First is the size of the bureaucracy for any given level of public 
activity. The bureaucratic and distributive tendencies contribute to 
growth along this dimension. To the extent that legislatures choose 
policy instruments which entail a larger commitment of personnel 
and resources than is necessary, the size of the government estab­
lishment is larger. 
Second is the intrusiveness of government activity. Bureaucratic 
means of implementing programs impose a burden on citizens-the 
burden of providing detailed information to the bureaucratic de­
cisionmaker, and then waiting for a decision. For example, a 
guaranteed annual income seems rather less intrusive than proving 
eligibility for the numerous income supplement/ security programs 
now in existence. General revenue sharing seems less burdensome 
to local government than applying for numerous categorical grants. 
A tax to curtail energy use, perhaps returned by reductions in other 
taxes, is simpler for an · concerned than detailed regulations regard­
ing "entitlements" to domestic oil, conversion of certain boilers to 
use coal, and mandatory gas curtailments for particular types of 
users. Again, the bureaucratic and distributive tendencies appear 
to contribute to a more intrusive kind of government than would 
otherwise be the case. 
Finally, a third aspect of size is an expansion in the scope of 
government activity, which occurs when the government chooses to 
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regulate an area not previously regulated, subsidize a sector not 
previously subsidized, tax something not previously taxed, etc. 
What does our model say about this third kind of government 
growth? As representatives increasingly attain reelection on the 
basis of their broker and ombudsman roles, programmatic electoral 
accountability as traditonally conceived weakens .  That is, incum­
bents have less need to hew closely to the policy positions of their 
constituents if the latter do not vote on the basis of such positions .29 
As the policy ties loosen, what do representatives do with their in­
creased flexibility? The model addresses only one aspect of that 
question-we have given our theoretical representatives no prefer­
ences other than reelection, and that only narrowly defined. It 
would be natural, however, to expand the model to have representa­
tives take a broader view of their personal interests. For example, 
they might use their policy freedom to maximize campaign contri­
butions and other political resources from well-organized groups .  
In principle, such efforts need not lead to government growth.  But 
we suspect that the preponderance of demands on government takes 
the form of requests for additional government activity-new reg­
ulations for consumerists, environmentalists, and good government 
types, new subsidies and/ or tariffs for business interests, new licens­
ing provisions for various professional groups, new grant programs 
for common interest groups of all types, and so forth. Thus ,  to the 
extent that representatives are free to depart from close agreement 
with their constituents, the existing pressures appear to suggest de­
partures in the direction of expanding the sphere of government 
activity. 
Summary 
The implications of our theory of legislative voting are highly 
speculative but potentially important. In addition to a "rich get 
29 Elsewhe re we prove tha t ( I )  the vote -maximizing poli cy pos itio:-i for an
inc mnb ent is for a la rger p ublic se ctor tha n is the vote -maximizin g stan ce for a 
challenge r; a nd ( 2 )  an incum bent ca n de via te from the vote -maxim izing policy 
posit ion in any direction by some a mount a nd sti ll win, given v ote -ma ximi zin g 
beha vior by the cha llenger, as l ong as i nc umbe nts a re exp ected to be bette r
faci litators and omb udsme n  tha n are cha llenger s .  The se cond poi nt is th e 
source o f  some uncertainty as to whether the model we ha ve de vel oped lea ds 
to a more extensi ve p ub li c  sector than traditiona l  iss ue -base d de mo crati c the ­
o ry. See Fiori na a nd No ll, "Vo ters, Burea ucra ts a nd Leg isla tors : A Ratio na l
Choice Perspe ct ive o n  th e Growth of  Burea ucracy," Journal of Public Eco
nomics 9 ( 1978 ) 1 - 1 6. 
MAJORITY RULE MODELS 1101 
richer" relationship between legislative majorities and minorities, 
we expect a systematic bias against certain types of policy instru­
ments which may well be more efficacious than those actually 
chosen. Consequently, societies may experience a shortfall in public 
policy accomplishments which could contribute to increasing cyni­
cism about the potential of democratic government. The same 
biases work toward the adoption of public policies which impinge 
on individual behavior more than is necessary and could thus con­
tribute to an increasing resentment of government activity, per se. 
Finally, though democratic politicians may decry big government, 
their individual, uncoordinated actions in support of their electoral 
interests contribute to that which they decry. The paradox is that 
at least in the short term these systemically troublesome features of 
legislative electoral arenas benefit the politicians who participate in 
them. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to traditional models of electoral competition, we find 
nothing mysterious about incumbent success in legislative elections. 
To the extent that representatives act as ombudsmen and pork bar­
relers rather than policymakers, their political experience and 
formal positions give voters a legitimate reason to support them over 
inexperienced challengers, even if the latter offer somewhat more 
attractive positions on issues. But we caution that the individual 
rationality of the voter combined with the individual rationality of 
the candidates need not produce a government which is the embodi­
ment of collective rationality. \Ve have suggested several ways in 
which myopic individual rationality can produce systematic biases 
against particular classes of public policy instruments. Moreover, 
we have observed that an incumbency advantage based on con­
stituency service may weaken electoral accountability as tradition­
ally conceived. The implications of such observations are neither 
fully worked out nor verified as yet, but the questions raised deserve 
attention. 
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APPENDIX : 
THE BASIC LOGIC OF MAJORITY RULE PROCESSES
This appendix provides an informal elaboration of the intro­
ductory remarks for the benefit of the general reader. By now 
most political scientists are familar with Downs' analysis of party 
competition in a one-dimensional policy space. Given single-peaked 
preferences, and universal voting, the ideal point (i.e. most preferred 
position )  of the median voter is the majority rule equilibrium.30 
When the policy space is of more than one dimension, however, 
this determinate result disappears. 
Consider Figure 1 which represents views from above a two­
dimensional policy space. Voters have unimodal preferences in 
this space such that the "farther" a position from their ideal point, 
the less they prefer it. Levels of preference are represented by 
indifference curves with outer curves indicating lower preference 
than inner curves. The analogy is to a topographical map where 
outer contours indicate lower elevations than inner contours. Points 
from which the indifference curves radiate are the voter maxima, or 
ideal points. Typically, assumptions are made about the shape of 
voter preferences. Convexity is a standard assumption. An indif­
ference curve is convex if a line joining any two points on the curve 
lies entirely within the area circumscribed by the curve (a circle is 
convex, a figure eight is not ) .  The case in which indifference 
curves are concentric circles is particularly simple; given any two 
points a voter with such preferences votes for the one that is closer 
to his ideal point. One can determine preference by use of a ruler 
or compass in this situation. 
In the top illustration in Figure 1 the ideal point of voter I is 
the majority rule equilibrium: it is closer to at least three voters 
(including voter 1 )  than any other point with which it might be 
compared. Note how all voters other than # 1 are divided into 
opposing pairs. This is an informal rendering of Plott' s conditions 
for the existence of a majority rule equilibrium. 
Now consider the second illustration which differs from the first 
only in that voter # 1  is placed a bit northeasterly from where he 
was previously. This slight movement destroys the equilibrium: 
no point in the space is closer to at least three voters than is any 
30 Downs, An Economic Theory, Ch . 8. Downs' analysis is an application of
Black's median dominance theorem . See "On th e Rationale of Group Decision
Making." 
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FIGURE 1 
5 
4 
I l l u st ra t i o n  of a M R  equ i l i b r i u m 
I l l u st ra t i on of I n d e t e r m i n a cy C h a r a c t e r i st i c of M R  
other point with which it might be compared.  For example, voter 
l's ideal point would lose to position x by the votes of 2, 4, and 5.
( The reader might verify this claim with a compass . )  Position x in 
tum would lose to position y by the votes of l, 2, and 3. And so on, 
forever. The work of McKelvey, Schofield, Cohen, and Cohen and 
Matthews demonstrates that the second illustration is the norm and • 
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the first the rare exception. The kinds of balancing conditions 
which underlie equilibrium seem exceedingly unlikely to hold in a 
reasonably differentiated policy space with large numbers of voters. 
And in the absence of such regularities majority rule is completely 
unconstrained : outcomes will be artifacts of the specific rules and 
procedures which determine the order of consideration of proposals, 
and these outcomes may vary wildly with such factors. 31 
s 1 All shown in Charles Plott and Michael Levine, "A M odel of Agenda In­
fluence on Committee Decisions," American Economic Review 68 ( March
1978 ) 146. 
